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Abstract We give derivations of two formal models of Gricean Quantity impli-
cature and strong exhaustivity in bidirectional optimality theory and in a signalling
games framework. We show that, under a unifying model based on signalling games,
these interpretative strategies are game-theoretic equilibria when the speaker is known
to be respectively minimally and maximally expert in the matter at hand. That is, in
this framework the optimal strategy for communication depends on the degree of
knowledge the speaker is known to have concerning the question she is answering.
In addition, and most importantly, we give a game-theoretic characterisation of the
interpretation rule Grice (formalising Quantity implicature), showing that under nat-
ural conditions this interpretation rule occurs in the unique equilibrium play of the
signalling game.
Keywords Conversational implicatures · Pragmatics · Game theory
1 Introduction
An utterance in context is typically interpreted as having, in addition to its conven-
tional, context-independent meaning, a conversational implicature that goes
beyond the truth-conditional meaning. Particularly productive for analysing a large
class of implicatures is the cooperative principle, introduced by Grice (1967):
speakers may be assumed to try to contribute to the (jointly) accepted purpose of the
conversation. We use simplified versions of Grice’s maxim of Quality and his first
submaxim of Quantity, as follows:
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Definition 1 (Quality) Say only what you know to be true.
Definition 2 (Quantity) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).
Given an utterance, the standard implicature via Quantity is that the speaker did
not intend to communicate any strictly stronger utterance (in the sense of truth-
conditional entailment) from a contextually given set of alternatives.1 For instance, if
the question ‘in the air’ is how many children John has, the utterance “John has two
children” standardly implicates that he does not have three or any greater number,
i.e., that he has exactly two children.2 However the strongest conclusion that can be
drawn via Quantity is that the speaker does not know that John has more children;
the exhaustive interpretation of the utterance says instead that she knows that
he does not have more children. To reach this stronger interpretation various authors
(see for example Spector 2003; van Rooij and Schulz 2004; Sauerland 2004) have
suggested a two-stage approach: first the weak epistemic reading is derived by stan-
dard Gricean reasoning, then this is strengthened by the assumption that the speaker
is an expert3 in the matter at hand.
In this paper we examine a formal implementation of quantity implicature and
exhaustive interpretation (originally proposed in the unpublished MA thesis of Katrin
Schulz, and extended for exhaustification by van Rooij and Schulz (2004), Schulz and
van Rooij (2006)), placed in the contexts of bidirectional optimality theory (Bi-OT)
and of signalling games. We show firstly that given strong restrictions on the epistemic
state of the speaker, quantity implicatures are derivable in Bi-OT. Next we show, under
much weaker restrictions in the signalling games context, that (under a natural imple-
mentation of ‘being expert’) the interpretation according to quantity implicatures is
rational just when the speaker is inexpert, and exhaustive interpretation just when she
is expert.4 We give, that is, a justification in terms of rational communication for the
formalisation of Quantity and exhaustive interpretation given by Spector (2003), van
Rooij and Schulz (2004), Schulz and van Rooij (2006).
Finally, we show that in the game with an inexpert speaker, certain natural restric-
tions on the form of the interpretative strategy (convexity and faithfulness, defined in
Theorem 27) completely characterise the strategy formalising quantity implicature:
only that strategy can form a Nash equilibrium in the signalling game.
1 We will see in Sect. 2 that the choice of alternative expressions is crucial for even the simplest cases.
2 That this is not truth-conditional meaning is easily seen: if the relevant question is whether he has (at
least) two children—for tax purposes, say—then the utterance no longer carries the implicature and he
might just as well have ten.
3 van Rooij and Schulz (2004) discuss speaker “competence”, however this might give rise to confusion
with the standard linguistic notion of the same name. We will therefore use the term “expertise” in this
paper.
4
‘Rationality’ here is in the game-theoretic sense of playing a Nash equilibrium.
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Notation
We write “|·|” for the cardinality of a set. We assume throughout a set W of relevantly
distinct possibilities, called for simplicity “worlds”. Q is always a one-place predi-
cate. If w is a world, then the valuation Vw(Q) gives the set of objects satisfying Q
in w.
We use an abbreviated notation for conditional probability: if x ∈ X and A ⊆ X
then we abbreviate P({x} | A) by P(x | A). (If P is a probability distribution over
a set X , then for A, B ⊆ X the conditional probability of A given B, P(A | B), is
standardly defined as P(A ∩ B)/P(B).)
The semantic denotation of an utterance f , [[ f ]], is the set of worlds in which f is
true. We lift this standard notion to the level of information states (sets of worlds):5
(| f |) def= {s ⊆ [[ f ]]; s = ∅}
Just as [[ f ]] gives the worlds in which f is true, (| f |) gives the information states in
which f is licensed, in the pragmatics sense of the maxim Quality. (Note that if s is
an information state then P(s | (| f |)) is concise notation for P({s} | (| f |)) and should
not be confused with P(s|[[ f ]]); the latter is only defined given a prior on individual
worlds which we generally do not have in this setting.)
Further notation will be introduced as needed.
2 Quantity and Grice
Formalising Quantity requires establishing which utterances count as potential alter-
natives; if the utterance “John has exactly two children” is also an alternative, then
this cannot be a Quantity implicature from “John has two children”. The standard
solution (taken by Horn (1972); Gazdar (1979); Levinson (2000), among others) is
to consider only alternative expressions from a linearly ordered scale conventionally
associated with the utterance (here the numerical expressions “John has (at least) n
children”), hence the term scalar implicature. The analysis given here genera-
lises this approach to partially ordered alternative sets, the quantity implicature
of utterances such as “John or Mary went to the party”. The appropriate alternative
expressions are the positive sentences:
Definition 3 (Positive sentences) Given a domain of objects D and a predicate Q,
we define the set of positive Q- expressions, FQ , as the set {Q(d); d ∈ D} closed
under conjunction and disjunction, where we assume for simplicity that each d ∈ D
has a unique name d.
(The resulting denotations are all upwards monotonic in the question predicate; it is
easy to see that introducing downwards-monotonic or non-monotonic expressions in
general destroys the predictions. If “John and Mary and nobody else” is an alternative
5 The notation is due to Michael Franke, p.c.. Leaving out the empty set is mainly for convenience.
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expression, then we will not strengthen the meaning of “John and Mary” via Quantity,
as desired.)
Suppose that the question ‘in the air’ is “Who went to the party?” and the answer
given is “John or Mary went to the party”. By quantity implicature we derive that the
speaker does not know that both John and Mary attended. The stronger exhaustive
interpretation is that the speaker knows that John and Mary did not both attend the
party.
In the framework described by van Rooij and Schulz (2004),Schulz and van Rooij
(2006) and Spector (2003), scalar implicature is a special case of generalised quantity
implicature, which is formalised as an interpretative principle “Grice”, incorporat-
ing both Quality and Quantity. The ‘Gricean interpretation’ of an utterance f takes
place against the background of a question predicate Q, the ‘matter at hand’, and the
utterance is interpreted as meaning the set of minimal models with respect to speaker
knowledge of Q (Quantity) where f is known to hold (Quality).6
Definition 4 (Ordering by positive knowledge) Let s, s′ ⊆ W be information states
for the speaker. We say she has no more positive knowledge of Q in s than
s′, s ≤KQ s′, (and analogously ‘has less’, <KQ) when:
s ≤KQ s′ def⇐⇒ ∀w′ ∈ s′ : ∃w ∈ s : Vw(Q) ⊆ Vw′(Q).
(The ordering by positive knowledge only takes account of whether two information
states differ in the positive Q-expressions they make true.)
Definition 5 (Minimising unstated positive knowledge) The Gricean interpretation of
an utterance f against a background predicate Q (according to Quality and Quantity)
is given by:
Grice( f, Q) def= {s ∈ (| f |); ∀s′ ∈ (| f |) : s ≤KQ s′}
= {s ⊆ [[ f ]]; ∀w′ ∈ [[ f ]] : ∃w ∈ s : Vw(Q) ⊆ Vw′(Q)}.
(That is, we restrict Quantity to informativity regarding positive knowledge; effec-
tively this corresponds to the restriction to a language consisting only of positive
expressions. Note also how the restriction to information states in (| f |) corresponds to
the requirement that Quality be fulfilled.)
As was already mentioned, this definition is not sufficient to derive the strong
exhaustive readings standard for utterances like (in answer to “Who went to the party?”)
“John went to the party”: not just that the speaker does not know of any other (rele-
vant) individual that they went, but that she knows that they did not go. The solution
given by van Rooij and Schulz (2004) (also Spector 2003) is to assume the speaker is
maximally expert with respect to Q (as far as this is consistent with the maxims).
6 We translate here the formal definitions of van Rooij and Schulz (2004) (which were given in a modal
logic setting) to a formalism more amenable to the signalling games analysis in the sequel.
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Definition 6 (Ordering by expertise) Let s, s′ ⊆ W be information states for the
speaker. We say that she is no more expert (about Q) in s than s′, s ≤EQ s′,
(and analogously ‘less expert’, <EQ) when:
s ≤EQ s′ def⇐⇒ ∀w′ ∈ s′ : ∃w ∈ s : Vw′(Q) ⊆ Vw(Q).
The ‘strong epistemic’ implicature of exhaustification can now be correctly derived
by maximising speaker expertise after applying Grice:
Definition 7 (Maximising expertise) Let f be a positive Q-expression. The exhaustive
reading of f is given by
Expert( f, Q) def= {s ∈ Grice( f, Q); ¬∃s′ ∈ Grice( f, Q) : s <EQ s′}.
Next we show that Grice, formalising both Quantity and Quality, can be derived
from Quality alone in bidirectional optimality theory.
3 Quantity and Bi-OT
Bidirectional Optimality Theory (Bi-OT), first introduced by Blutner (2000), states
that conventional language use is constrained by a bidirectional optimisation problem:
a speaker should choose an optimal message to express her intent, and a hearer should
choose the optimal interpretation for the message he hears. Optimality is expressed in
terms of a relation  (“is better than”) between form/interpretation pairs, which we
will return to in detail in a moment.
Definition 8 (Strong optimality) Let 〈 f, s〉 be a form/interpretation pair, where s is a
set of worlds (an information state). We say 〈 f, s〉 is strongly optimal iff it satisfies
the following two conditions:
¬∃s′ : s′ ⊆ [[ f ]] & 〈 f, s′〉  〈 f, s〉, (1)
¬∃ f ′ : s ⊆ [[ f ′]] & 〈 f ′, s〉  〈 f, s〉. (2)
Following Blutner (2000), we define the ordering relation in terms of a complexity-
related cost for forms, and the conditional probability of the interpretations given the
semantic meaning of the form (this second clause gives a preference for stereotypical
interpretations):
Definition 9 (Bi-OT preference ordering) Given forms f, f ′ and interpretations
(information states) s, s′, the commonly known hearer’s subjective probability dis-
tribution P on worlds and a cost function “cost” mapping forms to numerical costs,
the relation is better than, “”, is defined by
〈 f, s〉  〈 f, s′〉 def⇐⇒ P(s | [[ f ]]) > P(s′ | [[ f ]]),
〈 f, s〉  〈 f ′, s〉 def⇐⇒ P(s | [[ f ]]) > P(s | [[ f ′]])
or P(s | [[ f ]]) = P(s | [[ f ′]]) & cost( f ) < cost( f ′).
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(in other cases, the pairs 〈 f, s〉 and 〈 f ′, s′〉 are not ordered either way.) We show now
how, using strong optimality, we can derive the interpretative function Grice given
above.
3.1 Weak Epistemic Quantity in Bi-OT
We will focus in this section on Grice, the weak epistemic implicature (“…and I don’t
know that anyone else came”). We will return to Expert in the signalling games setting
(Sect. 4), where we focus on the difference between the weak epistemic interpretation
and full exhaustification.
The following definition gives a probabilistic interpretation to “as informative as
is required” in the maxim of Quantity:
Definition 10 (Probabilistic quantity implicature) Take FQ to be the set of posi-
tive Q-expressions. Define the following equivalence relation ≈ on worlds: w ≈ w′
iffde f ∀ f ∈ FQ : f is true in w iff f is true in w′. Let us assume that for each induced
equivalence class there exists exactly one representative. We now let W be the set of
those representative worlds. Let P a distribution on information states such that all
interpretations are held possible.
Let f ∈ F be an arbitrary utterance; the interpretations given by (probabilistic)
quantity implicature from f are defined by
Quant( f, FQ) def= {s ∈ (| f |) ; ∀ f ′ ∈ F : s ∈ (| f ′|) → P(s | (| f |)) ≥ P(s | (| f ′|))}.
(That is, an information state s is in Quant( f, FQ) if no alternative form makes
s more likely than f does. Compare this to the definition of Grice, which makes no
explicit mention of the set of alternative forms at all.)
In the remainder of this section we show firstly that this definition corresponds
(under a strong condition on the probability distribution over information states) to
strong optimality, and finally that as an interpretative strategy it is equivalent to Grice
(thus retroactively justifying the name!).
Lemma 11 If the probability distribution P over information states is uniform
(P(s) = P(s′) for all s, s′ ⊆ W ), and all forms are taken to have the same cost,
then
Quant( f, FQ) = {s ⊆ W ; 〈 f, s〉 is strongly optimal}.
[ Take s ∈ Quant( f, FQ) arbitrary. Now 〈 f, s〉 is not strongly optimal if there is a
better 〈 f ′, s〉 or 〈 f, s′〉. Suppose the former; then for some f ′ = f such that s ⊆ [[ f ′]],
P(s | [[ f ′]]) > P(s | [[ f ]]) (since messages have equal cost)—but then s ∈
Quant( f, FQ) is a contradiction. Suppose instead the latter; then for some s′ = s such
that s′ ⊆ [[ f ]], P(s′ | [[ f ]]) > P(s | [[ f ]]), which is impossible since the distribution
on information states is uniform.
For the converse, take 〈 f, s〉 an arbitrary strongly optimal pair. Then ¬∃ f ′ ∈ FQ :
s ⊆ [[ f ′]] & P(s | [[ f ′]]) > P(s | [[ f ]]); that is, ∀ f ′ ∈ FQ : s ⊆ [[ f ′]] → P(s | [[ f ]]) ≥
P(s | [[ f ′]]), thus s ∈ Quant( fQ). ]
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This simple proof is included because it can easily be adopted to prove the simpler
scalar implicature version of the above:
Corollary 12 Take only messages arranged in a linear order by entailment (for
instance the numerical expressions “John has n children” in the “at least” reading),
and take single worlds as interpretations; as before, all messages are of equal cost and
the distribution on worlds is uniform. Then only the pairs 〈“John has n children”, w〉
where “John has exactly n children” is true in w are strongly optimal.7
(That is, precisely the standard—exhaustive—scalar implicature is produced by
Biot; adapting Quant to probabilities of single worlds conditional on the semantic
denotation gives the same result, by the proof given above. In fact, taking information
states as interpretations leads to a weak epistemic version of scalar implicature, and
maximising expertise in the sense of Definition 7 gives again the same result. We omit
the details.)
Now the claim is that the interpretative principle Quant formalises the maxims of
Quantity and Quality. Recall that the interpretative principle Grice, Definition 5, is
taken as a formalisation of precisely these maxims. We will now show that Grice and
Quant are equivalent.
We define first a piece of helpful notation:
Definition 13 (Q-minimality) Let X be a set of worlds and Q a question predicate.
The Q- minimal worlds in X are given by
minQ(X)
def= {w ∈ X; ¬∃w′ ∈ X (Vw′(Q) ⊂ Vw(Q))}
Using minQ( · ), for any information state s we can define a positive Q-expression fs
with the useful properties s ⊆ [[ fs]] and minQ([[ fs]]) = minQ(s) (that is, [[ fs]] is the
upward completion of s in the ordering ≤KQ). We omit the details.
7 More formally, let 〈 f1, . . . , fk 〉 be a set of messages linearly ordered by entailment, [[ fn ]] ⊂ [[ fm ]] ⇔
n > m. Take the possible worlds instead of information states as interpretations, and assume all worlds are
equally likely. Then 〈 fn , w〉 is strongly optimal iff w ∈ [[ fn ]] \ [[ fn+1]].
To prove this, let 〈 fn , w〉 be a pair corresponding to an intepretation by scalar implicature: w ∈ [[ fn ]] \
[[ fn+1]]. The pair 〈 fn , w〉 is not strongly optimal if there is a better 〈 fm , w〉 or 〈 fn , w′〉. Take fm for m = n.
If m > n then w ∈ [[ fm ]], so P(w | [[ fm ]]) = 0 < P(w | [[ fn ]]), thus 〈 fn , w〉  〈 fm , w〉. Suppose instead
that m < n, then while w ∈ [[ fm ]], since w ∈ [[ fn ]] ⊂ [[ fm ]] we have P(w | [[ fn ]]) > P(w | [[ fm ]]), so
〈 fn , w〉  〈 fm , w〉.
Take w′ = w. Suppose w′ ∈ [[ fn ]]; then P(w′ | [[ fn ]]) = 0 < P(w | [[ fn ]]), so 〈 fn , w〉  〈 fn , w′〉.
Suppose w′ ∈ [[ fn ]]; then by our assumption that all worlds are equally probable, P(w′ | fn) = P(w | fn)
so 〈 f, w〉  〈 f, w′〉.
That is, the two conditions of Definition 8 hold: the pair in question is strongly optimal. The same arguments
are almost sufficient to show that only these pairs are strongly optimal: we have only to consider the case
of 〈 fn , w〉 where w ∈ [[ fn+1]] (all other possibilities were already excluded above by strict inequality with
some strongly optimal pair). But this, too, has a better alternative: above we considered only variations in w,
but if we take the pair 〈 fn+1, w〉 then since w ∈ [[ fn+1]] ⊂ [[ fn ]] we have P(w | [[ fn+1]]) > P(w | [[ fn ]])
so 〈 fn+1, i〉  〈 fn , w〉, that is, 〈 fn , w〉 is not strongly optimal.
That is, all and only those pairs corresponding to the scalar implicature are strongly optimal.
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Lemma 14 Using minQ( · ) we can formulate Grice( f, Q) in two equivalent ways:
Grice( f, Q) = {s ∈ (| f |); minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s} (3)
= {s ∈ (| f |) ; minQ([[ f ]]) = minQ(s)}. (4)
Now we are ready to show that Quant and Grice are equivalent.
Proposition 15 Let Q be a one-place question predicate and f a positive
Q-expression. Take all positive Q-expressions as alternatives to f , and informa-
tion states (subsets of W ) as interpretations. Assume that all information states have
non-zero probability. Then
Grice( f, Q) = Quant( f, FQ).
Proof We prove this via lemmas 16 and 17 by reducing Quant( f, FQ) to the refor-
mulated definition of Grice( f, Q) given in (3).
Lemma 16 If s and s′ are arbitrary sets and minQ(s) ⊆ s′ ⊆ s then minQ(s) =
minQ(s′).
[ If w is Q-minimal in s, then no world in s′ can give Q a smaller denotation; if w
is not Q-minimal in s then some w′ ∈ minQ(s) gives Q a smaller denotation and
w′ ∈ s′. ]
Lemma 17 If f and f ′ are positive Q-expressions, then [[ f ]]=[[ f ′]] ⇐⇒ minQ
([[ f ]]) = minQ([[ f ′]]).
[ For any positive Q-expression f , an easy induction shows that f[[ f ]] = f . (In other
words, positive Q-expressions are monotonic in Q.) The result follows immediately. ]
Now for the reduction. First, take s and f such that s ∈ (| f |) but s ∈ Grice( f, Q);
by (3), then, minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s. We will show that the form fs (with denotation the
upward completion of s) is preferable for s in Quant, just as it is in Grice.
Let s′ be the (non-empty) information state minQ([[ f ]]) \ s. Since minQ( fs) =
minQ(s), s′ ⊆ [[ fs]] so [[ fs]] ⊂ [[ f ]] (by monotoniticy of forms, minQ([[ fs]]) ⊆
[[ f ]] ⇒ [[ fs]] ⊆ [[ f ]]). But now by the assumption that no information state in (| f |)
is considered impossible, and since s ⊆ [[ fs]] ⊂ [[ f ]] (so s ∈ (| fs |) ⊂ (| f |)), we have
P(s | (| f |)) < P(s | (| fs |)), which implies s ∈ Quant( f, FQ).
Next, take s such that minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s, so s ∈ Grice( f, Q), and suppose towards
a contradiction that for some f ′ such that s ∈ (| f ′|) we have P(s | (| f ′|)) > P(s | (| f |))
(so s ∈ Quant( f, FQ)). Since s ∈ (| f |), for all alternative forms such that [[ f ′]] ⊆ [[ f ]]
we have P(s | (| f ′|)) ≤ P(s | (| f ′ ∧ f |)) so without loss of generality we restrict our-
selves to strengthenings of f .
Then by the probabilities [[ f ′]] = [[ f ]], so Lemma 17 gives us minQ([[ f ]]) =
minQ([[ f ′]]). But we have minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ [[ f ′]] ⊆ [[ f ]] which by Lemma 16 implies
minQ([[ f ′]]) = minQ([[ f ]]), a contradiction by Lemma 17. So no such f ′ can exist,
which implies s ∈ Quant( f, FQ).
That is, s ∈ Quant( f, FQ) ⇐⇒ minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s ⇐⇒ s ∈ Grice( f, Q). unionsq
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This means that under Bi-OT we can derive Quantity (represented by Grice) from
Quality (required for optimality), at least under the assumption of a uniform distribu-
tion over information states. A Bayesian approach would suggest a roughly uniform
prior in the absence of other information, but as long as we use Bi-OT as a predictive
theory we (think we) require exact uniformity.
In the following we will model an inexpert speaker as having a non-negligible
probability of making inexact observations; then Bayesian ignorance can be seen as a
special case of this notion, but exact uniformity is clearly far too strong a requirement.
The important thing to note about Proposition 15 is that, unlike Lemma 11, the
probability distribution need not necessarily by uniform, only everywhere non-zero.
We show now, via the equivalence of Grice and Quant, that the same Gricean strat-
egy is selected in a game-theoretic setting, under much more reasonable restrictions
on the distribution.
4 Quantity and Signalling Games
Signalling games were introduced by Lewis (1969) to explain the existence of con-
ventionalised meanings of linguistic expressions. In this context a typical model
has multiple equilibria, and the choice of one among them is a matter of conven-
tion; Lewis’s aim was indeed to show how such conventions might spontaneously
arise without prior agreement (which would itself rely on a pre-existing conventional
language). In this paper we use signalling games instead for pragmatics, in the tradi-
tion of Parikh (2001), Benz et al. (2006): we assume a predetermined (conventional)
semantic meaning for the signals and show which (pragmatic) refinements of the
semantic meaning are optimal in a game-theoretic sense. In contrast to the games of
Lewis, here we have as desideratum a single equilibrium: given a pre-existing semantic
convention, the pragmatic refinement should be uniquely determined. We will see that
this goal is not reached in the basic model, but the addition in Sect. 5 of a structural
constraint on the interpretative strategies gives us the refinement we are looking for.
Formally, a signalling game is a game of asymmetric incomplete information
between a sender S and a receiver R, with chance moves by Nature. Given is a set
of worlds W , a set of messages FQ , and a probability distribution P over informa-
tion states (the moves of Nature). Nature shows an information state to the Sender,
she sends a message f to the Receiver, and he plays an interpretation action,
a set of information states which we read as “the (perhaps pragmatically enriched)
interpretation of f ”.8
Definition 18 (Interpretation signalling game) An interpretation signalling
game is a tuple 〈Q, W, FQ, [[ · ]], utilityn, P〉 with the following properties:
• Q, as above, is a one-place predicate;
• W is the full set of possibilities (“worlds”) differing in the extension of Q;
• FQ is the set of positive Q-expressions;
8 Rather than define interpretation games in full generality, we include here the refinements specific to
this application. A fully general definition would specify neither the objects taken as observations (and
interpretations) nor the form of the utility function.
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• [[ · ]] is the standard semantic denotation function (from which we derive also the
lifted version (| · |));
• utilityn : ℘(W ) × ℘(℘(W )) → R is a function parameterised by n (as given
below) which specifies the utility of each interpretation (by the receiver) in each
information state (of the sender);
• P is a probability distribution on information states, such that all states in ℘(W )
occur with positive probability.
A play of the game is a triple 〈X, f,Y〉 where X ⊆ W is an information state
(the observation given by Nature to the Sender), f ∈ FQ is a message (sent by
the Sender) and Y ⊆ ℘(W ) is a set of information states (the interpretation of the
Receiver).
The utility function has the form
utilityn(X,Y) def=
{
P(X |Y) if X ∈ Y,
−n otherwise,
where the parameter n is a large integer, the penalty for unsuccessful communication.
This gives the payoff of a play π = 〈X, f,Y〉 directly:9
U(π) def= utilityn(X,Y).
We will frequently wish to discuss families of games that vary only in their penalty
values or observation distributions. Given a game G = 〈Q, W, FQ, [[ · ]], utilityn, P〉,
penalty value m and distribution P ′, we write
Gm
def= 〈Q, W, FQ, utilitym, P〉,
G P




def= 〈Q, W, FQ, utilitym, P ′〉.
The penalty models the intuition that communicative failure is always the worst
outcome, no matter how much effort is saved in arriving efficiently at a wrong inter-
pretation. To see this, however, we need to be able to describe the strategies the two
players use to produce their moves.
Definition 19 (Strategies) A sender strategy is a (total) function σ : ℘(W )→FQ
giving a message in each information state. A receiver strategy is a (total) func-
tion ρ : FQ → ℘(℘(W )) giving an interpretation, a set of information states, for each
message in FQ . A language is a pair 〈σ, ρ〉 where σ is a sender strategy and ρ is a
receiver strategy.
A play 〈X, f,Y〉 is according to the strategies σ and ρ if σ(X) = f and
ρ( f ) = Y .
9 In comparison to standard signalling games, this definition corresponds to the “cheap talk” assumption
that messages are costless.
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(The definitions of strategies for S and R express the information asymmetry of
the game. The sender observes (partially) the state of the world, but the receiver must
use only the message in arriving at an interpretation.)
Now we can explain the necessity of the penalty value. Suppose this was absent
(in the current model, simply set the penalty value n to zero). Now imagine that the
same message, f , is sent in two information states s and s′ that occur with equal
(relatively high) probability. Then the interpretations ρ( f ) = {s}, ρ( f ) = {s′} and
ρ( f ) = {s, s′} all have equal payoff, so the third strategy, which never gives rise to
communicative failure, is not preferred. Worse yet, if s is (even only very slightly)
more probable than s′, then this strategy is actually worse than ρ( f ) = {s}: the strategy
giving rise to communicative failure almost half the time is actually preferred. Setting
a numerical value on the penalty for communicative failure turns out to be crucial for
the analysis of expertise, as we will see in Sect. 4.1.
Definition 20 (Payoffs) Given a game G = 〈Q, W, FQ, [[ · ]], cost, utility, P〉 and a
language L = 〈σ, ρ〉 for G, the expected utility (or payoff) of L in G, EUG(σ, ρ),
is given by
∑
{P(X) · U(X, f,Y); 〈X, f,Y〉 is a play according to σ and ρ}.
A sender strategy σ is a best sender response to a receiver strategy ρ in G if for
all σ ′ = σ , EUG(σ, ρ) ≥ EUG(σ ′, ρ), a strict best response if the inequality is
everywhere strict, and analogously for best receiver responses.
We define also the expected utility of σ and ρ at an information state X
(or at a message f ) by taking expectations over only those plays according to σ
and ρ that include the information state (or message), and write this EU(σ, ρ)(X) (or
EU(σ, ρ)( f )).
We use the standard game-theoretic notion of Nash equilibrium to single out certain
preferred strategies: a pair of rational agents will play a language that is a Nash equi-
librium because if the language is not an equilibrium, then some player has a payoff
incentive to change their strategy.
Definition 21 (Nash equilibrium) A language 〈σ, ρ〉 is a Nash equilibrium for the
game G if σ is a best reply to ρ and vice versa. It is a strict Nash equilibrium if
σ and ρ are mutual strict (i.e., unique) best replies.
Now we give two related games, representing respectively an inexpert and an expert
speaker, and show that the Nash equilibrium solution concept selects the strategies we
want in each case.
4.1 Expertise in Signalling Games
The translation of the notion of ‘expertise’ to the signalling game proceeds via the
probability distribution on observations (with appropriate adjustments of the penalty
parameter in the utility function). The intuition is that an expert speaker is more likely to
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make precise observations, whereas with an inexpert speaker we cannot know whether
their utterance was prompted by exact knowledge of the situation or by an extremely
vague observation. So for a maximally inexpert speaker we expect all information
states to appear with non-negligible probability.
As was stated earlier, we model Quality via the semantic denotation function taking
messages to the set of worlds in which they are true. That is, we consider only sender
strategies σ that satisfy, for all information states s, s ⊆ [[σ(s)]]. We will take Grice
and Expert as interpretative strategies, defining receiver strategies ρG and ρE:
ρG( f ) def= Grice( f, Q),
ρE( f ) def= Expert( f, Q).
Definition 22 (Inexpert speaker) Take δ ∈ [0, 1] a “reasonably large” value. The dis-
tribution P represents an inexpert speaker (with respect to δ) if ∀s ⊆ W :P(s)≥δ.10
Let Pδ represent an inexpert speaker for some given value of δ. Then by choice of
n we can always construct a game G Pδn such that for any sender strategy σ utilising all
messages, the unique best receiver reply ρBR(σ ) is given by ρBR(σ )( f ) = σ−1( f ) def=
{s ⊆ W ; σ(s) = f }. We call such a game a game with inexpert speaker.
Theorem 23 Let G be a game with inexpert speaker. Then in G,
1. ρG has a unique best sender reply σG, and 〈σG, ρG〉 is a strict Nash equilibrium;
and
2. for no sender strategy σ is 〈σ, ρE〉 a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of clause 23 Let ρ be an arbitrary receiver strategy for the game G,n . Then the
speaker’s best reply σBR(ρ) is given by
σBR(ρ)(s) = arg maxf ∈FQ{P(s | ρ( f )); s ∈ ρ( f )}.
For ρG, the receiver strategy assigning to each message f its Gricean interpretation
Grice( f, Q), this is
σBR(G)(s) = arg maxf ∈FQ{P(s | ρ( f )); s ∈ Grice( f, Q)}.
But now a property of Grice makes this apparent optimisation problem trivial: each
information state s occurs in Grice( f, Q) for exactly one message f . The set { f ; s ∈
Grice( f, Q)} is a singleton. So the “arg max” is redundant, the best reply is selected
simply by being uniquely s-optimal.
To see this, recall that the form fs is the minimal (in terms of set inclusion) message
whose denotation contains s: s ⊆ [[ f ]] ⇒ minQ(s) ⊆ [[ f ]] ⇒ [[ fs]] ⊆ [[ f ]], since
minQ(s) = minQ([[ fs]]) generates [[ fs]] by the Q-monotonicity condition on forms.
10 Clearly for values of δ larger than the reciprocal of the number of information states no distribution will
satisfy the condition.
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Now if we assume that all information states are held possible, s ⊆ [[ fs]] ⊂ [[ f ]] ⇒
P(s | [[ fs]]) > P(s | [[ f ]]), so s ∈ Grice( f, Q). That is, under these assumptions,
each information state gives rise to a unique optimal message.11
If we take this observation to define Grice as a strategy for production, σG(s)
def= fs ,
then it is easy to see that Grice = 〈σG, ρG〉 is its own best response:
ρBR(σ )( f ) = {s; σ(s) = f }
ρBR(G)( f ) = {s; σG(s) = f }
= {s; fs = f }
= {s; minQ(s) = minQ([[ f ]])}
= ρG( f )
(by the rephrased definition of Grice( f, Q), (4) from Lemma 14).
That is, Grice interpreted in this way as strategies 〈σG, ρG〉 is its own unique best
reply, a strict Nash equilibrium. unionsq
The second clause of Theorem 23 is easy to see. Let σ be a strategy for which
ρE is a putative best reply; since σ is total, a best receiver response ρBR(σ ) should
include every information state in the interpretation of some message. But ρE does not
do this (some information states are uninducable, i.e., there are information states
s for which there is no f ∈ FQ such that s ∈ ρE( f ) = Expert( f, Q)), so the payoff
according to ρE falls short of that given by ρBR(σ ) according to the penalty.
Definition 24 (Expert speaker) Take  ∈ [0, 1] a value ‘reasonably close’ to zero.
The distribution P represents an expert speaker (with respect to ) if for all s ⊆ W ,
P(s) <  just in case ∃w,w′ ∈ s : Vw(Q) ⊂ Vw′(Q).
(Note that this definition is a rough parallel to Definition 6, in that the observations
receiving low probability are each less expert than some other observation that receives
high probability.)
Definition 25 (Game with expert speaker) A game G Pn is a “game with expert speaker”
if there exists a positive probability  such that:
1. For any receiver strategyρ, if for any s, s′ ⊆ W and f ∈ F we have {s, s′} ⊆ ρ( f )
and P(s) <  ≤ P(s′), then ρ is not a best response to any sender strategy in
G Pn ; and
2. P represents an expert speaker with respect to .
Intuitively the triple 〈δ, n, 〉 as a whole represents a ‘cultural parameter’ of lan-
guage use, corresponding roughly to the notion of how much evidence is ‘enough’
to justify stating something with conviction. It has been suggested, on the basis of
data from Malagasy, that quantity implicature is not in fact universal Keenan (1977);
11 Compare for instance mention-some questions (“Where can I buy a newspaper?”), in which for many
information states several answers are intuitively equally optimal; these require a different payoff function,
and will not be treated further in this paper.
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an alternative interpretation of the data seems to be that the “required degree of con-
viction” parameter is in this case turned extremely high. It is interesting to speculate
whether this representation could also be applied to languages requiring explicit evi-
dential markers (see for example Ifantidou 2001).
Theorem 26 Let G be a game with expert speaker. Then in G,
1. for no sender strategy σ is ρG a best response; and
2. there is at least one σ which is a best sender response to ρE, and for every such
σ , ρE is in turn the unique best receiver response.12
The first clause follows immediately from the construction of the game with expert
speaker. The second clause is a generalisation of the notion of Nash equilibrium, which
is necessary in the signalling games setting when (as in this case) some information
states are uninducable.13 We cannot (as in Theorem 23) simply find a sender strategy
forming a strict Nash equilibrium: how such a strategy behaves on the uninducable—
low probability—information states will not affect the payoff, so there will be many
non-strict best responses. What is ensured by the construction, however, is that all of
these sender strategies will behave the same way on the high-probability information
states, and thus that ρE will be the unique best receiver response to each of them.
5 Grice Characterised
In the previous section we showed that playing according to Grice is rational when
the speaker is inexpert, and according to Expert when she is expert. However the
question still remains, what of other possible strategies? In the case of an inexpert
speaker, the game also admits of a multitude of alternative solutions, some decidedly
pathological-looking. We would like to do more than show that Grice is rational, we
would like to show that it is the only rational strategy given an inexpert speaker. The
following characterisation result comes much closer to achieving this desideratum:
Theorem 27 Let G be a game with inexpert speaker. Let ρ be a receiver strategy with
the following properties:
1. ∀ f ∈ F : [[ f ]] ∈ ρ( f ) (“Faithfulness”), and
2. ∀s, s′, s′′ ⊆ W : ∀ f ∈ F : s ⊆ s′ ⊆ s′′ & s, s′′ ∈ ρ( f ) ⇒ s′ ∈ ρ( f )
(“Convexity”).
Then there exists a sender strategy σ (obeying Quality) such that 〈σ, ρ〉 is a strict
Nash equilibrium in G if and only if ρ( f ) = Grice( f, Q).
Clearly these conditions alone are not sufficient to characterise Grice. The require-
ment of rational play in a game with inexpert speaker ensures that minQ([[ f ]]) ∈ ρ( f )
12 The formulation is a special case of the notion of an evolutionarily stable set of languages: it
is—roughly speaking—a maximal closed set of neutrally stable (mixed) strategies surrounded by a region
of strategies that earn lower payoff, in this case with the additional property that each language appearing
in the set has the same sender strategy.
13 In more general terms: when there are more states than messages, and when mixed strategies are
disallowed.
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for each message f ; this provides a minimal element for each interpretation. Faithful-
ness provides a maximal element, and Convexity fills in the information states between
to match Grice.
Proof First, let ρ( f ) = Grice( f, Q) for all f ∈ F . By Lemma 14 (4), [[ f ]] ∈
Grice( f, Q) for all f , so Faithfulness is fulfilled. Now take s, s′, s′′ ⊆ W and f ∈ F
such that s, s′′ ∈ Grice( f, Q). Then by Lemma 14 (3),
minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s ⊆ s′ ⊆ s′′ ⊆ [[ f ]]
⇒ minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ s′ ⊆ [[ f ]]
⇒ s′ ∈ Grice( f, Q),
so the Convexity condition is also satisfied.
The converse is a little more involved. Suppose that ρ is both faithful and convex (in
the sense of Theorem 27). It is sufficient to show that if ρ occurs in a Nash equilibrium
language, then for all f , minQ([[ f ]]) ∈ ρ( f ). [ In that case by faithfulness [[ f ]] ∈ ρ( f )
and by the convexity condition all s ⊆ [[ f ]] such that minQ( f ) ⊆ s ⊆ [[ f ]] also occur
in ρ( f ); that is, ρ( f ) ⊇ Grice( f, Q). If ρ( f ) = Grice( f, Q), then some informa-
tion state s′ outside Grice( f, Q) is also in ρ( f ); then s′ will also appear in ρ( f ′) for
some f ′ = f , so ρ is not the best response to any sender strategy, a contradiction.]
Let ρ occur in a Nash equilibrium language. Suppose towards a contradiction that
for some f ′ = f that minQ([[ f ]]) ∈ ρ( f ′). Let σ be a best response to ρ; then
σ(minQ([[ f ]]) = f ′. If σ obeys Quality, since message denotations are upwards
monotonic we have minQ([[ f ]]) ⊆ [[ f ]] ⊆ [[ f ′]]. But since {∗; minQ([[ f ]]), [[ f ′]]} ⊆
ρ( f ′) (by faithfulness and our hypothesis), by the convexity condition we have also
[[ f ]] ∈ ρ( f ′). But now by faithfulness we have also [[ f ]] ∈ ρ( f ), and this means, for
games with inexpert speakers, that ρ is not a best reply to σ , or indeed to any sender
strategy.
That is, if ρ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 27 and occurs in a Nash equilib-
rium language, then for all f , minQ([[ f ]]) occurs only in ρ( f ); this in turn implies
that ρ( f ) = Grice( f, Q), and the equivalence is complete. unionsq
The names of the conditions in Theorem 27 are deliberately suggestive. These are
not arbitrary properties, they are in fact very natural constraints on the structure of an
interpretative principle.
The first, Faithfulness, is perhaps even stronger: it can be read as a requirement
on the relation between semantics and pragmatics in the model. Recall that we began
by simply stipulating a conventionalised semantic meaning for each of our messages.
If the “semantic meaning” of some message is never in the interpretation by a receiver,
it could be described as somewhat disengenuous to continue to call it “semantic mean-
ing”; the faithfulness requirement then ensures that our terminology remains honest.
The convexity condition is a closure property on sets; like any such, it helps enor-
mously for describing, learning, and remembering the interpretations these sets repre-
sent, since we can compactly describe a set in terms of just a few of its elements. In our
case, we can describe the pragmatic interpretation of f in terms of just minQ([[ f ]]),
once the two constraints are given. Convexity constraints in particular play an impor-
tant role in describing linguistic universals in generalised quantifier theory (Thijsse
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1983; Benthem van Benthem 1986) and cognitive semantics (Gärdenfors 2000), and
are given an independent game-theoretic motivation in Jäger (2007).
6 Conclusion
We have given a game-theoretic implementation of the interpretative principles Grice
(Quantity implicature) and Expert (exhaustive interpretation) defined by van Rooij
and Schulz (2004), Schulz and van Rooij (2006) and Spector (2003). In a signalling
games framework we specified what it means to have an expert speaker by means of
the penalty value and ‘degree of conviction’ parameter bundle 〈δ, n, 〉. Under these
definitions, we found that interpretation according to Grice and Expert is rational
in exactly the cases we would expect; Grice induces a strict Nash equilibrium in the
inexpert case and thus fixes the sender strategy, while Expert in the expert case leaves
some details of the sender strategy unspecified but is nonetheless stable in a natural
extended sense.
These models did not achieve the desideratum of singling out a unique pragmatic
interpretation rule. To do this we require in addition structural constraints on the form
of an interpretative strategy: Faithfulness (that pragmatic interpretation should not
discard the semantic meaning) and Convexity (that the interpretation of a message
should be a convex set, under the set inclusion partial order). With these constraints,
and with an inexpert speaker, the uniquely rational interpretative strategy is Gricean
Quantity implicature.
Note also that all these results have an interpretation in evolutionary game theory:
strict Nash equilibrium corresponds to evolutionary stability, while the extended equi-
librium notion required for the expert speaker is closely related to neutral stability and
the notion of an evolutionarily stable set of strategies. In particular, the characterisa-
tion result implies that Grice is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy for the game
with inexpert speaker.
This perspective suggests a different way of looking at the relationship between
Grice and Expert. If we consider speaker strategies instead of interpretative strate-
gies, Theorem 26 shows that Expert is nothing but Grice restricted to the information
states of an expert speaker. Combined with the characterisation result of Theorem 27
we are left with a picture of Grice as a fundamental pragmatic rule and Expert as
an application of that rule in the common case of a speaker we trust to know what she
is talking about.
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